Last week brought an unexpected development in the election world: an Executive Order from President Donald Trump directing the decertification of federally approved voting systems that use QR codes to encode votes. The surprising order drew attention to a long-standing concern shared across the political spectrum—QR codes cannot be read or verified by voters, who therefore cannot correct vote-recording errors– resulting in undermining public confidence in our elections and unauditable election results.
Georgia is particularly impacted by the EO. Georgia is one of only two states using ballot barcodes statewide. State law also requires that the voting system be certified by the U.S. Election Assistance Commission (EAC). The touchscreen system used encodes votes in a QR code— a digital barcode, that under the new presidential order, is scheduled for decertification within 180 days.
Whatever one’s view of the politics surrounding this issue, the practical implications are undeniable. Georgia’s current system is on a fast-ticking clock to see its certification revoked. Unless the General Assembly acts now, Georgia’s elections could be conducted on touchscreens that are not legally authorized for use, or counties could be left to develop individual solutions without guidance from the General Assembly or State Election Board.
The good news: A backup voting method
Georgia already has an authorized contingency plan. A long-standing statute provides for a backup voting method using hand-marked paper ballots. This backup system was designed for precisely this kind of situation. It’s for a mechanized or electronic system component becomes legally unusable, impractical, or insecure.
What’s needed now is legislative action to trigger this safety net. We have recommended a proposed amendment to House Bill 397 doing exactly that. Our proposal directs the State Election Board to promulgate detailed rules for the orderly and secure use of hand-marked paper ballots counted by the current precinct scanners/tabulators, with a phased transition by March 31, 2026. Importantly, it gives counties the flexibility and support to move at their chosen pace, while ensuring Georgia has a legally compliant, verifiable system ahead of the next major election cycle. Financial incentives are proposed for counties which commit to near term conversion.
Time is short for legislative action
The General Assembly has only three days remaining in this session. That’s not enough time to develop statutes for permanent adoption of hand marked ballots, or to debate the overhaul touchscreen machines and purchase of new hardware, (a $70 million+ expenditure), to remove the QR codes from BMDs. But it is enough time to pass a common-sense amendment instructing the State Election Board to begin ordering and specifying rules for the use of the backup balloting system long authorized by law. (Since the earliest days of mechanized vote-counting in the early 1900s, having a legally authorized paper ballot back-up contingency plan has been essential.) The wisdom of that contingency provision is obvious now.
Longer-term decisions about Georgia’s voting system— whether to use hand-marked ballots, adopt new technology, or modify the BMD system— should be debated in the 2026 session after thorough study and public input, and use of hand marked ballots in upcoming 2025 elections. But now, the focus must be on ensuring Georgia is not caught unprepared with a decertified system. The solution would also avoid pending non-compliance with the General Assembly’s 2024 order to remove QR codes from ballots by July 1, 2026. That’s an order that Secretary Raffensperger apparently plans to ignore, given the $70+ million system update cost.
This action by lawmakers would also address cybersecurity risks, ballot secrecy and transparency concerns, thus saving millions in taxpayer funds. QR codes, by their nature, are black holes of votes, unintelligible to voters. Hand-marked ballots, by contrast, allow the voter to confirm their choices— reducing errors, increasing trust and allowing meaningful audits and recounts. This is not possible with electronic ballot markers.
Safeguarding the 2026 elections
The proposed amendment also strengthens election security by requiring low cost long-overdue software updates to address known vulnerabilities in Georgia’s touchscreen system and fixing ballot secrecy flaws in the Dominion software. These are prudent, nonpartisan safeguards that deserve broad support.
Lawmakers seem generally unaware of this development, so they need to hear from the people they represent. Voters, candidates, political parties and local election officials must speak up— early this week. Pretending the Trump EO was never issued won’t make it go away.
The General Assembly should not irresponsibly leave their counties in a lurch when the decertification of the system hits in just a few months. With the legislative session ending this Friday, there is no time to delay.
Marilyn Marks is the executive director of the non-partisan Coalition for Good Governance. The organization is plaintiff in the Curling v Raffensperger federal lawsuit seeking to prohibit the use of QR codes and electronic ballot marking devices in Georgia elections.
